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You Can Run but You Can't Hide:




As the world becomes more technologically advanced, courts increas-
ingly face issues with applying traditional legal rules to complex electronic
device cases. In United States v. Graham, the Fourth Circuit was no excep-
tion. The Fourth Circuit was recently forced to determine if the government
invaded an individual's Fourth Amendment rights when it obtained, from a
third party, historical cell-site location information (CSLI), which can be
used to deduce "the location of a cell phone use.",
When making and receiving phone calls and text messages, the user
generates a CSL signal. The signal is then transmitted from the phone to a
cell tower to complete the call or text. The Fourth Circuit erroneously held
that the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment when, without a
warrant, it obtained 221-days' worth of CSLI.2
The court reasoned that the defendants did not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the data because: (1) direct cell phone surveillance is
distinguishable from acquiring information from a third party; (2) Supreme
Court precedent and fellow appellate courts' rulings supported the holding;
and (3) the data was voluntarily conveyed according to the third-party doc-
trine.3 This case note criticizes the court for not thoroughly and specifically
defining what it means to voluntarily convey information. Moreover, the
court placed too much emphasis on the third-party doctrine instead of the
Fourth Amendment's touchstone analysis that pertains to reasonableness. In
a world dominated by advanced sensory data and technology, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has created dangerous precedent in light of growing security and policy
concerns.
II. BACKGROUND
After a nine-day joint trial in 2015, a jury convicted Aaron Graham and
Eric Jordan of several offenses arising from a series of armed robberies that
occurred between January 17 and February 5, 2011.4 On the last day of the
* Merissa Sabol is a 2018 candidate for a Juris Doctor from SMU Dedman
School of Law. She received a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Bay-
lor University.
1. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Graham II].
2. Id. at 424-25.
3. Id.
4. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted,
624 F. App'x 75 (4th Cir. 2015), and adhered to in part on reh'g en banc, 824
F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Graham I].
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spree, Graham and Jordan were arrested for the robberies.5 After lead investi-
gator Chris Woerner noticed several similarities between the robberies, he
prepared and executed search warrants for Graham's residence, Jordan's resi-
dence, and the get-away pickup truck.6 The searches recovered various items,
including two cell phones.7 Warrants for the phones were successfully ob-
tained, and Detective Woerner matched each phone number to the ones pre-
viously shared by the defendants.8
In preparation for trial, the government requested cell phone informa-
tion from the service provider, Sprint/Nextel, through two court orders for
the disclosure of historical CSLI for calls and texts transmitted to and from
both phones.9 The government submitted a broad application for information
from July 1, 2010 through February 6, 2011, a 221-day span.lo The applica-
tion was granted and the government used the recovered CSLI at trial to
place Graham and Jordan near the banks at the time the armed robberies
occured.II
Graham and Jordan filed several pre-trial motions, including a motion to
suppress the CSLI data obtained by the government from Sprint/Nextel on
Fourth Amendment grounds.12 The U.S. District Court of Maryland denied
the motion to surpress, and the case proceeded to trial.13 Ultimately, a jury
returned guilty verdicts for both defendants on all counts.1 4 After the District
Court denied the defendants' motion for re-trial, the defendants appealed to
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.15 In its first hearing, the Fourth Circuit
held that acquiring CSLI without a warrant was a violation of the defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights.16 The government subsequently moved for, and
was granted, a rehearing en banc.17 The Fourth Circuit's second hearing, and
the subject of this case note, affirmed the defendants' convictions and held
that there was not a Fourth Amendment violation.18





10. Graham 1, 796 F.3d at 341.
11. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 424.
12. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 341.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 342.
15. Id.
16. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 424.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 424 n.1.
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III. PRIVACY LAW
A. The Fourth Amendment
The issue before the court was whether obtaining the historical CSLI
records qualified as a Fourth Amendment search.1 9 The Fourth Amendment
safeguards "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ."20 A
search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy that society recognizes as reasonable.21 Inquiry into whether such a
search occurred begins by identifying the nature of the challenged state activ-
ity.22 Here, the activity was the government's procurement of historical CSLI
records from Sprint/Nextel.23
B. The Third Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine provides an exception to the expectation of pri-
vacy granted by the Fourth Amendment.24 The U.S. Supreme Court declared
that an individual does not receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment
in information he voluntarily turns over to a third party, 25 even when, the
information is revealed assuming that it will be used only for a limited pur-
pose and the confidence between the parties will not be betrayed.26 By volun-
tarily revealing private affairs, the individual risks that the information will
be given to the government. 27 Thus, an individual cannot expect the Fourth
Amendment to protect information voluntarily disclosed to third parties be-
cause society does not recognize a subjective expectation of privacy in the
information as reasonable.28
C. The Stored Communications Act
To retrieve historical CSLI records from a third party, the government
must follow the Stored Communications Act (SCA).29 To gain access to non-
content records, the SCA mandates that the government: (1) obtain a warrant
19. Id. at 425.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 425 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33
(2001)).
22. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 741).
26. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
27. See Graham H1, 824 F.3d at 427 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
28. See id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743).
29. Id. at 426.
2017] 77
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
by a court of competent jurisdiction;30 (2) use an administrative subpoena or
trial subpoena if prior notice was given to the subscriber or customer; 31 or (3)
obtain a court order following Section 2703(d).32 Here, the government chose
to secure a court order through the third option.33 Abiding by the Section
2703(d) procedure for a court order, the government had to provide "specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
. .. the records ... are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investi-
gation."34 On this point, Graham and Jordan argued that the SCA violates the
Fourth Amendment by permitting the government to collect private
information.35
IV. HOLDING AND RATIONALE
The Fourth Circuit found that the government's acquisition of CSLI
from Sprint/Nextel did not constitute a search; thus it did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.36 The court's rationale had many bases, including: (1)
distinguishing direct surveillance and acquiring information from a third
party; (2) Supreme Court precedent and fellow appellate court rulings; and
(3) the third-party doctrine.37
A. Direct Surveillance Distinguished
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by distinguishing direct govern-
ment surveillance and acquiring information from a third party.38 Relying on
three Supreme Court cases, defendants argued that there is always an inva-
sion of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy when the govern-
ment uses technological devices to track one's movement. 39 The court
disagreed and found that the government did not engage in tracking or direct
surveillance of the defendants.40 Although the government might have been
able to deduce location information, the CSLI data obtained did not enable
the government to specifically locate either defendant because it could only
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A) (2012).
31. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i).
32. Id. §§ 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(1)(B).
33. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 439 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c), (d).
35. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 426.
36. Id. at 424.
37. Id. at 424-38.
38. Id. at 426.
39. See id.; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 32-33 (2003); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
714-15 (1984).
40. Graham H1, 824 F.3d at 426.
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determine a four-square-mile area,4 1 whereas direct surveillance would have
provided an exact pinpoint location.
B. Precedent
Then, the Fourth Circuit asserted that Supreme Court precedent from
Smith v. Maryland was controlling.42 Similar to Smith, the defendants "un-
questionably exposed" the CSLI information transmitted from their phones to
Sprint/Nextel through their equipment,43 and making or receiving a call or
text are activities within the ordinary course of cell phone ownership.44 By
giving the CSLI to Sprint/Nextel, the defendants assumed the risk that Sprint/
Nextel would disclose the data to the government.45
The court bolstered its reasoning by relying on controlling law from
fellow appellate courts.46 The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts
hold that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI data obtained
by the government via a SCA Section 2703(d) order.47 The defendants' argu-
ments lacked support from "relevant authority and would place [the Fourth
Circuit] in conflict with the Supreme Court and every other federal appellate
court to consider the question"-a position this court was unwilling to take.48
C. Third Party Doctrine
Next, the defendants argued that the third-party doctrine was inapplica-
ble because a cell phone user does not own the CSLI to voluntarily convey
information and, even if he or she did, revealing the information is com-
pelled, not voluntary.49 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument because
defendants, "misapprehended the nature of CSLI, improperly attempted to
redefine the third-party doctrine, and [relied] on a long-rejected factual
argument."50
The court found that CSLI is conveyed by the user, to the service pro-
vider, through information generated by making and receiving calls or texts
through the phone.51 For a service provider to generate a CSLI record, the
41. Id. at 426 n.3.
42. Id. at 425.
43. Id. at 427; see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
44. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 427.
45. Id. at 427-28.
46. Id. at 428, 436-37.
47. Id. at 428.
48. See id. at 429.
49. Supp. Brief of Defendant-Appellants at 10-11, Graham II, 824 F.3d 421 (4th
Cir. 2016) (No. 12-4659) (en banc).
50. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 429.
51. Id.
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transmission of information must occur between the phone and cell tower.52
The conveyance is voluntary because a user's location is recorded whenever
he voluntarily makes or receives calls and texts through the provider's net-
work.53 While users do not directly inform service providers of which cell
tower to use, voluntariness is inherent in the nature of the purchase and ser-
vice agreement to provide cell phone reception.54
Further, the defendants tried to redefine the third-party doctrine by as-
serting that it is inapplicable because users do not actively choose to share
CSLI information.55 However, the court held that this requirement is un-
founded in federal case law.56 Many federal rulings permit the government to
acquire third-party records, even when individuals do not actively choose to
share historical CSLI.5 If changed to an "actively choosing to share" rule,
"then any effort to acquire records of incoming phone calls would constitute
a search protected by the Fourth Amendment" because only the user that
dialed the call actively chose to share the information.58
The defendants also inappropriately relied on a long-rejected factual ar-
gument and case law involving the content of communications, as opposed to
non-content communications.59 Defendants argued that conveying CSLI in-
formation is involuntary because they must either produce CSLI or opt out of
society.60 Dissenting justices have made similar arguments in prior cases, but
the court here found that reliance on those opinions was misplaced.61
Moreover, defendants relied on case law involving disputes over the
contents of the comilunications (i.e., information contained in the communi-
cation) as opposed to non-content information (i.e., information that enables
service providers to transmit the content). 62 CSLI is non-content because it
specifically identifies the equipment used to route calls and texts. 63 The ma-
jority admitted that security concerns can arise from the aggregation of non-
52. Id.
53. Id. at 430.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 431 (quoting Redacted Brief of Defendant-Appellants at 30, Graham II,
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 12-4659, 12-4825)).
56. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 431.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 432.
60. Supp. Brief of Defendant-Appellants, supra note 50, at 11.
61. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 433; see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 433.
63. Id.
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content routing information, but it would "blink[ ] at reality" to find that
CSLI rises to the level of content needed for Fourth Amendment protection.64
Finally, defendants contended that the amount of information ob-
tained-seven months of records-was a search.65 Relying on the fact that
the third-party doctrine contains an intrinsic assumption that quantity does
not matter, and because the CSLI data was voluntarily conveyed, the court
held that the "very act of disclosure negated any reasonable expectation of
privacy, regardless of how frequently that disclosure occurred . . . ."66 More-
over, the court opined that the legislative branch is far better positioned to
adjust privacy protections as technology develops.67 The Supreme Court may
revisit the third-party doctrine one day, but the Fourth Circuit maintained that
it was "bound by the contours" of the current third-party doctrine.68
V. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Judge Wilkinson's Concurring Opinion
Judge Wilkinson's concurring opinion emphasized his concern that re-
quiring probable cause and a warrant to obtain CSLI data would "needlessly
supplant" a congressional standard with a judicial one. 69 Section 2703(d) al-
ready mandates the requirements for a valid court order and provides a stan-
dard of reasonable suspicion.70 Judge Wilkinson supported the majority's
holding because to accept the defendants' approach would overturn Supreme
Court precedent and destroy congressional efforts to balance privacy and law
enforcement interests.71
Developing constitutional meaning is not the sole responsibility of the
judiciary but instead, a "collaborative enterprise among the three departments
of government."7 2 Moreover, when Congress has weighed in on the require-
ment of reasonableness within the context of the Fourth Amendment, a cer-
tain degree of deference should be given to the legislature given its greater
access to expert opinions, better positioning for legal consistency, and the
preservation of democratic legitimacy to a highly controversial area rife with
64. Id. at 434.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 435-36.
67. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 436.
68. See id. at 437.
69. Id. at 438 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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criminal motivations.73 In sum, Judge Wilkinson found it unnecessary to de-
part from a "carefully tailored scheme."74
B. Judge Wynn's Partial Dissent
Judge Wynn wrote a partial dissent affirming the defendants' convic-
tions but objecting to violations of the Fourth Amendment.75 He analyzed the
Supreme Court's use of voluntary conveyance through case law.76 The two
elements of voluntary conveyance are knowledge of the particular informa-
tion and an action submitting the information.77 A cell phone user is likely
unaware that any CSLI data is being transmitted; that he is conveying it; that
his service provider is collecting and storing the data; and that specific cell
phone towers are routing his calls and texts. 78 Thus, Judge Wynn found that
user knowledge was absent.79
Furthermore, "CSLI is purely a function and product of cell phone tech-
nology, created by the provider's network when a cell phone call connects to
a cell site."80 The network automatically generates CSLI when the phone
receives a call, whether or not the user actually answers or participates.81
"Because a user neither possesses knowledge of the information nor actively
submits the information," he or she could not have voluntarily conveyed lo-
cation information.82
In application, because CSLI data is not voluntarily conveyed, Judge
Wynn argued that these circumstances cannot be evaluated purely by the
third-party doctrine.83 A proper analysis should include an independent eval-
uation of the quality and quantity of data acquired and would ask whether the
government "violated a subjective expectation of privacy that society recog-
nizes as reasonable."84 Although CSLI may not be able to pinpoint a direct
address like a GPS, the quantity of cell site points collected over 221 days is
73. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 440.
74. Id. at 439.
75. See id. at 441 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 442.
77. Id. at 443.
78. Id. at 445.
79. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 445 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 862 (2014)) (internal
quotations omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 446 (quoting In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider
of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d
Cir. 2010)).
83. Id. at 446.
84. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
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nearly eight times greater than that determined unconstitutional in Jones.85
Judge Wynn reasoned that the vast quantity of data gathered provided exten-
sive details about the defendants' locations, infringing on their reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 86 .
Judge Wynn also raised future policy concerns implicated by the major-
ity's decision.87 He stated that the rule was too broad because as technology
allows for a proliferation of smaller and smaller cell sites or the advent of
smartphone "pinging," the outcome stagnates. 88 Because the majority did not
take into consideration the preciseness of the data collected, the holding is
inadaptable and inflexible as technology becomes more sophisticated.89
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
A. The Components of the Third-Party Doctrine
The Fourth Circuit's justification for relying on the third-party doctrine
is particularly troublesome as the crux of the analysis-voluntary convey-
ance-is frustratingly vague. It is indisputable that the CSLI was actually
conveyed. Instead, the analysis hinges on whether or not it was voluntarily
conveyed. The true legal meaning of "voluntary" necessitates a thorough
analysis of its uses and surrounding factual circumstances. The dissent's ar-
gument is the most compelling because of its thorough investigation into case
law and its determination of what it truly means when someone voluntarily
conveys data.
For example, in United States. v. Bynum, the Fourth Circuit held that the
third-party doctrine applied to subscriber information when an individual
typed his name, email address, phone number, and physical address into a
form and then submitted the information to a service provider to secure in-
ternet access.90 There, the defendant not only had knowledge of the informa-
tion he provided, but he also knew he was releasing that information to the
service provider, and he affirmatively acted in doing so.9 1 Moreover, in
United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that the third-party doctrine
applied to the IP addresses of visited websites.92 When an internet user typed
a URL-which is tied to a single IP address-into a web browser and hit
85. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 447-48 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 448.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 448-49.
89. Id. at 448.
90. United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010).
91. Id.
92. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
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"Enter," the user knew the web address being used and actively submitted the
information to get to that website.93
Here, the defendants never interacted with the CSLI function in the
same way one types in a URL to go to a website destination or subscriber
information to access the Internet. In all of the cases relied on by the major-
ity, there were many data pieces compiled into records and a discrete action
behind each piece of data.94 But in Graham, no discrete action on behalf of
the defendants occurred. In other words, there was not the same knowing
disclosure of CSLI data to phone companies because cell phone users never
affirmatively disclosed their location to the service provider to make a call.95
The defendants cannot choose the cell tower that receives the CSLI signal,
which carries out the desired activity. Dialing a phone number or sending a
text message and expecting either to be sent because of an intrinsic, discrete
function of cellular service is distinct from the process of using a specific
URL code to visit a specific website. Further, it is likely that the defendants
had absolutely no knowledge that their cell phones were transmitting histori-
cal CSLI as they received and made calls or text messages. The defendants
also likely had no knowledge that Sprint/Nextel was collecting and saving
the data.
Moreover, it is illogical to conclude that because a user voluntarily pur-
chased the equipment and signed a service agreement, he also voluntarily
agreed and actively conveyed private personal data through his rightful own-
ership and use of the device. Voluntarily agreeing to own the hardware
should not mean that any and all data naturally and involuntarily transmitted
through it to a third party is an intentional abandonment of all privacy expec-
tations. For example, simply because one owns a computer needed to utilize
purchased internet services, does not justify the conclusion that the individual
has divested himself of all reasonable expectations of privacy by using the
required tools for connection. Nonetheless, the majority uses this argument
as justification for eliminating all Fourth Amendment protection.
Consumers have devices that are connected to and send information to a
number of different entities, and consumers do not realize that the device is
connected or that it is collecting private information.96 The majority's expan-
sive holding fails to help future courts distinguish between information an
individual voluntarily conveys and information electronic devices automati-
cally record, generate, and transmit to third parties. 97 Accepting the dissent's
93. Id.
94. Graham II, 824 F.3d at 443 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
95. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 534-35 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J.,
dissenting).
96. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REv. 85,
90 (2014).
97. Graham H!, 824 F.3d at 446 n.8 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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thorough analysis of what it means to voluntarily convey information would
provide latitude for a court to truly analyze the knowledge and active conduct
of the user. The failure to distinguish between something that is intentionally
chosen and voluntarily conveyed versus something that is forcibly conveyed
leaves an expanding technological era with an outdated view of information
conveyance.
B. Re-Focusing the Analysis of Graham II Towards the Two-Part
Katz Test
The 'majority's opinion relies heavily on the third-party doctrine as well
as content and non-content designations. As technology has advanced and
society's reliance on it has grown, the extent of information exposed to third
parties has increased considerably since Miller and Smith (cases to which the
majority gives significant weight).98 In Jones, Justice Sotomayor stated:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information volunta-
rily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks . . . . I would not assume that all information vol-
untarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited pur-
pose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.99
The Fourth Amendment makes clear that the touchstone of the analysis
is reasonableness. Katz v. United States is the cornerstone case in which the
Supreme Court established the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in de-
termining whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred.oo The test is
two-fold: (1) whether the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy; and (2) whether that expectation of privacy is one society would
recognize as reasonable.O1
This test, as opposed to the third-party doctrine or the content or non-
content designation, can provide the discretion necessary to analyze these
issues as technology progresses. If the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
analysis is reasonableness, then each case should be analyzed according to
this two-part test. Simply because a user voluntarily conveys information to a
third-party should not mean that he is automatically without Fourth Amend-
ment protection. Furthermore, having to draw a line in a mountain of data to
determine what is non-content and what is content leaves little structure for
future application of the law because the list would be endless.
98. Davis, 785 F.3d at 538 (Martin, J., dissenting).
99. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
100. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
101. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
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Moreover, information that might be deemed as non-content in a singu-
lar occurrence could be viewed as content in the aggregate. The Katz test
allows for flexibility, while applying a rigid rule to ever-evolving fact scena-
rios by investigating the truth of what an individual expects to keep private.
Surveillance data "generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about his familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations."102 The aggregation of CSLI
data points could equally convey what the contents of one letter, email,
phone call, or text message could reveal. Relying more heavily on the estab-
lished Katz test will provide a more accurate and protective analysis of what
one expects to keep private. Ultimately, this will secure the greatest amount
of constitutional protection.
C. Future Implications for Data Transmitted and the Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Graham is especially problematic in
the context of security and one's expectation of privacy. Technology is
quickly advancing and growing more and more pervasive, especially in the
realm of electronic sensors. For instance, the Breathometer is a device that
plugs into the headphone jack of your smartphone and contains an ethanol
sensor to estimate blood alcohol content from one's breath.103 However, the
manual never mentions a privacy policy governing the data generated by the
device or where the information is stored. 04The privacy policy is actually on
the company's website, at the bottom of the webpage, in a small link, which
then informs the user that one's blood-alcohol test results are stored "indefi-
nitely in the cloud, cannot be deleted by the user, [and] may be disclosed in a
court proceeding if necessary . . . ."105 The potential ramifications that data
can have on a user's life are vast: employment, criminal liability, obtaining
insurance, to name a few.106 The Breathometer is just one example of the
thousands of electronic sensors that capture incredibly nuanced data about
our personalities, habits, tastes, and behavior.
Despite the differences in data between historical CSLI data and blood
alcohol content from the Breathometer, the data provided enough precise
pinpoint location data to convince a jury that Graham's and Jordan's location
patterns were conviction worthy.107 Applying the majority's rule to the
Breathometer sensor data would render the information stored on third party
servers and clouds unprotected by the Fourth Amendment because it is non-
102. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
103. Peppet, supra note 97, at 87.
104. Id. at 89-90.
105. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Graham H1, 824 F.3d 421, 440 (4th Cir. 2016).
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content and is voluntarily conveyed by the user to a third party. Although the
government may not have access to the results of the blood alcohol test,
under the majority's holding, they could gather enough data to deduce fre-
quency of use, as well as where and when you use the application. This
effectively means that private health data is unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment-a realm of life that society has consistently shown warrants a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
VIH. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit failed to accurately and fully identify what it means
for an individual to voluntarily convey information under the third-party doc-
trine. The opinion neither used the proper Fourth Amendment analysis of
reasonableness, nor fully comprehended the repercussions and impact this
precedent will have on society and future courts. Although the defendants
failed to convince a jury of their innocence, the Fourth Circuit should have
unanimously agreed that allowing acquisition of this critical evidence was a
violation of the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights. To think that this pre-
cedent could potentially govern health, fitness, and personal data transmitted
through other applications on smartphones or other electronic devices shows
just how broad and unwise this decision is. As the majority suggests, hope-
fully the legislature will assume its proper role in lawmaking and remedy the
wrong created by this holding. Without a reassessment of the rule, this coun-
try is potentially left with an inflexible precedent that is slowly diluting the
rights protected by the Constitution.
872017]1
